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A Goal for Reform: Make Elections 
Worth Stealing 
E lection reforms have attracted substantial 
attention since the troubled elections of 
2000. Some address problems in the adminis 
tration of elections. Others aim to regulate the 
conduct of elected officials and lobbyists. A 
third category affects the structure by which 
elections are conducted. It is not clear whether 
the same over-arching problem motivates inter 
est in these reforms. One common theme may 
be that public confidence in representation suf 
fers as a result of actual or perceived deficien 
cies in the conduct of elections and elected 
officials. The failure to count votes accurately, 
the fact that eligible voters find they are unable 
to vote, the inability of minor parties to access 
ballots, revelations of scandalous relations be 
tween representatives and lobbyists, the power 
of wealthy donors, the lack of "civility" in po 
litical discourse, the uncompetitive nature of 
many elections, may all somehow act together 
to erode public trust, and reduce participation 
and engagement with representative democracy. 
In considering contemporary electoral ar 
rangements, we must ask, "what is the main 
problem that reforms intend to target, and what 
are the mechanisms by which reforms might 
fix the problem?" If public cynicism about rep 
resentative democracy is part of the problem 
that reforms are sup 
by posed to fix, it is not 
Todd Donovan, 
clear how much im 
provement in the admin 
Western Washington istration of elections can
University accomplish. 
The sources 
of public cynicism 
about elections may 
include a polarized party system and uncom 
petitive elections that fail to mobilize or en 
gage many citizens. Contemporary reform 
proposals that attract bipartisan support may 
have little effect on this problem. 
Reforms of Old: The Responsible 
Party Model 
One of the most enduring academic state 
ments in favor of political reform was the 
American Political Science Association's report 
(1950) "Toward a More Responsible Two-Party 
System," which called for wholesale changes 
to how American political parties operated. In 
1950, "weak" parties were the target of reform 
ers. One of the "problems" reformers identified 
was that American parties did not provide an 
adequate opportunity for the electorate to hold 
govemment accountable. Parties in power were 
not able to control their members in office, nor 
coordinate the branches of govermment, nor 
effectively implement programmatic goals that 
defined the party. The lack of intra-party cohe 
sion left voters unable to assign responsibility 
to a party and unable to select between distinc 
tive governing and opposition party options. 
The report proposed several reforms to make 
the two major parties more hierarchical, cohe 
sive, programmatic, and ideologically distinct 
from each other. These included (but were not 
limited to): strengthening national party offices 
with more funding and staff resources; chang 
ing rules to allow parties a meaningful role in 
financing congressional candidates; increasing 
party discipline in Congress; creating more 
coherent party leadership over rank and file 
members of Congress; closing participation in 
nomination contests to registered partisans; 
giving rank-and-file party members direct con 
trol over delegate selection to national conven 
tions; placing greater emphasis on national 
policy in congressional elections; and placing a 
greater emphasis on policy in party platforms. 
For decades after the issue of the report, the 
fragmentation of the party system at the elite 
level, the shift to candidate-centered presiden 
tial nominations, the decline of attachments to 
parties in the electorate, and the lack of collec 
tive responsibility in the American political 
system remained problems of concern for polit 
ical science (e.g., Polsby 1983; Wattenberg 
1991; 1998; Fiorina 1980). 
There is some irony upon reviewing the re 
port. We have not heard as much in recent 
years about the ideological congruence of the 
parties, nor as much about a lack of party 
unity in Congress. Enough has transpired to 
create a situation where arrangements appear a 
bit like what the report wished for. Party iden 
tification played a stronger role in structuring 
voter behavior by the late 1990s than it did 30 
years earlier (Bartels 2002). Party leadership in 
Congress, although by no means parliamentary, 
is more cohesive and hierarchical than in de 
cades past (Sinclair 2006). Even with "soft 
money" excluded, parties now play a much 
larger role in financing congressional races, 
and in recruiting candidates. 
Party Polarization 
Evidence that parties are more internally 
cohesive and ideologically distinct can be seen 
in floor voting in Congress (Groseclose et al. 
1999; Poole and Rosenthal 1997), and in pub 
lic attitudes and behavior. The proportion of all 
floor votes where most House Democrats voted 
one way and most House Republicans voted 
the other increased through the 1970s, 1980s, 
and 1990s. The percent of Democrats voting 
together against Republicans who voted to 
gether on such unity votes increased steadily 
through 2000 (Donovan and Bowler 2004, 44). 
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Scholarship in political science has 
moved from a 1950s concern that 
Democrat and Republican elites (and 
voters) were often indistinguishable 
from each other on many measures 
(e.g., Campbell et al. 1960), to a more 
recent debate about whether the polar 
ization of American parties exists only 
at the elite level (Fiorina et al. 2005), 
or at both the elite level and in the 
mass public (Layman and Carsey 
2002; Hetherington 2001). 
One less documented aspect of this 
polarization is that Democrats increas 
ingly dislike Republican candidates, 
and Republicans increasingly dislike 
Democratic candidates. Since 1968, 
Democratic partisan identifiers have 
given Republican presidential candi 
dates lower marks on feeling ther 
mometer scores measured in American 
National Election Study (NES) sur 
veys. On average, Democrats ranked 
President Richard M. Nixon at or 
above 55 both years he won, and 
placed President Gerald R. Ford 
around 50-in other words, Democrats 
generally had positive or neutral feel 
ings about these Republicans. By 
2004. however. Democrats rated Presi 
dent George W. Bush a cool 34, and Republicans were cooler 
toward Democratic presidential nominee John Kerry in 2004 
than they were to any Democratic presidential candidate other 
than George McGovern.' One explanation of these trends is that 
conservative Southern voters have migrated from the Demo 
cratic to the Republican Party (Rhode 1991; Black and Black 
2003), while liberal Republicans have been migrating to the 
Democrats. Another is that the parties' candidates now better 
reflect the clear, ideologically defined choices that the 1950 
APSA report recommended. 
Partisans' dislike of their rival party's candidates extends to 
evaluations of congressional candidates as well. Democratic par 
tisans have held fairly steady in their feelings about Democratic 
congressional candidates since 1978, while becoming increas 
ingly cool toward Republican congressional candidates. Republi 
cans have grown more fond of Republican congressional 
candidates since 1992, and have become much cooler about 
Democratic candidates since 1990. From 1990 to 2004 there 
was a steady increase in this gap. By accident or by design, the 
American political system is now characterized by polarized 
party elites, and by polarized partisans. 
The sources of this polarization lie in demographic trends 
(McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal 2006), and in the structure of 
our election system (Cox and Katz 2002; Jacobson 2005). Re 
alignment in the South and in New England has made the con 
sistency base of the national parties more internally cohesive. 
Nomination processes in homogeneous districts (Burden 2004), 
the role of "extremist" party activists (King 1997), and ideolog 
ically motivated patrons who control campaign funds may have 
also shaped the pool of successful candidates and increased the 
distance between the parties. 
In addition, the small number of competitive districts in the 
U.S. House means that the vast majority of representatives are 
from safe seats. These districts elected members who were more 
extreme ideologically than the national median voter (or the 
median district nationally).2 Figure 1 plots the DW-NOMINATE 
scores for members of the 109th Congress, categorized by the 
Figure 1 
Floor Votes of Members of 109th Congress, by Their Vote 
Share in Previous Election 
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Note: Each bar represents the average DW-NOMINATE score for representatives in each type 
of district. -1 = most liberal, 1 = most conservative. Representatives are categorized by their 
2004 vote share. The number under (over) each bar is the number of districts in a category. 
incumbent candidates' 2004 vote share. This illustrates that the 
safest Democrats had the most liberal floor votes, while mar 
ginal Democrats3 had more centrist records. The most marginal 
Republicans also had the most centrist records among Republi 
cans. Marginality is also the mechanism that translates national 
vote-swings against a party into lost seats. In 2006, five of the 
19 most marginal House Republicans were defeated, and six 
others in this category (where the member received between 
50-54.9% support in 2004) retired. In the next category (55% 
59.9%), eight of 40 incumbents were defeated, and six retired. 
(Nearly) every Republican seat that shifted in 2006 was in one 
of the three most marginal categories of Figure 1. Although Fig 
ure 1 demonstrates that marginal members have more centrist 
voting records, several of the most marginal Republicans who 
lost had DW-NOMINATE scores that placed them beyond the 
mean for their party (see Figure 2).4 
The 2006 midterm election may suggest that even with polar 
ization and limited competition, U.S. elections still act as a 
mechanism that allows voters to hold government accountable. 
But as the values above and below the bars in Figure 1 illus 
trate, there are few marginal districts. By 2002, there were 
fewer two-party competitive U.S. House districts than at any 
point since 1900 (Donovan and Bowler 2004). A 5.5% vote 
swing against the majority party in 2006 yielded a 30-seat mid 
term loss that was below average for comparable elections in 
the post-WWII era. In 1994, the 6.3% "Republican Revolution" 
swing against Democrats produced a 55-seat loss. The post 
Watergate swing of 5.8% against Republicans in 1974 produced 
a 48-seat loss. A 5% swing yielded a 47-seat loss in 1958. The 
decline in competition means it may now take a larger swing to 
move fewer seats (Issacharoff and Nagler 2006). 
In addition to effects on the magnitude of seat swings, mar 
ginality has consequences for the distribution of representation. 
With fewer competitive seats, there are fewer representatives 
in the center. This is illustrated in Figure 2, which displays the 
number of representatives in the 109th Congress across the 
ideological range (represented by DW-NOMINATE scores). 
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Figure 2 
Distribution of Representation in the U.S. 
House, 109th Congress 
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Note: Bars reflect the number of representatives with 
DW-NOMINATE scores in the ranges listed on the x-axis. 
Values to the left are more liberal, values to the right more 
conservative. N = 434, mean = -0.02. 
Those farthest from the center tend to come from safer seats 
(see Figure 1) and thus are most insulated from national vote 
swings against their party. 
The bimodal distribution in Figure 2 demonstrates the ab 
sence of a center in the American political system. It is a distri 
bution at odds with the ideological self-placement of the 
American electorate, which has the qualities of a normal, "bell 
shaped" distribution (Fiorina et al. 2005). Yet in the House, the 
median Democratic representative in the 109th Congress was 
reflected by liberal members such as Patrick Kennedy (RI) and 
Howard Berman (CA). The median Republican by conservatives 
Dennis Hastert (IL) and Virgil Goode (VA), a vocal opponent of 
Muslim immigration and of a Muslim being swom-in to the 
109th Congress with the Koran. In 2004, the presidential candi 
dates were also linked to the ideological poles of their party in 
Congress. This can be seen when Bush and Kerry are placed on 
a similar roll-call vote measure of ideology. Kerry's floor votes 
placed him to the left of a large majority of senators from his 
party, while Bush's (inferred) issue positions placed him to the 
right of nearly all senators from his party (Clinton et al. 2004). 
Be Careful What You Wish For 
Whatever the causes of elite polarization, our current political 
environment reflects some (or much) of what the 1950 reform 
ers wished for. This begs the questions: Having achieved an 
outcome somewhat similar to what a previous generation of re 
formers aspired to, are we better or worse off as a result? Is 
there increased electoral accountability? Is there greater engage 
ment with representative democracy? 
If standard measures of behavior and public attitudes about 
electoral politics are used to answer this question, the answers 
might be "no." As of 2004, cynicism about elections was near 
(or at) the highest levels recorded in the era of modemn Ameri 
can survey research. Attachments to major parties reached a 
record low in 2000. Consider the data in Figure 3. Although 
partisanship may now play a stronger role in structuring the 
Figure 3 
Party Identification; Proportion of 
Independents, 1952-2004 
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Source: National Election Study. 
Note: The lower three lines plot trends in the percent of NES 
respondents replying "independent" to the initial three-part measure 
of party identification, then by their responses to the follow-up 
question asking if they "lean" toward one of the major parties. 
votes of people who identify with a party and who continue to 
vote, fewer people identify with parties today. The 2000 NES 
measure of partisan affiliation found 40% of Americans self 
identifying as independent, the highest level since the survey 
began in 1952. It is true that most of these independents report 
"leaning" toward a major party when prompted, and when their 
vote choices are limited to candidates from the major parties 
they are, behaviorally, quite similar to partisan identifiers (Keith 
et al. 1992). But when it comes to their attitudes about the two 
party system, independent "leaners" appear more like "pure" 
independents than partisans. "Leaners" have little regard for 
maintaining the two-party system, they are more likely to sup 
port third-party candidates, and they prefer divided government 
(Donovan et al. 2005; Bowler et al. 2006). A substantial propor 
tion of Americans fail to identify with a party system that 
presents increasingly polarized choices. And while barriers to 
voting have been reduced,5 turnout declined (outside the South) 
or at best remained stagnant from 1972 to 2000.6 
The rise of ideologically cohesive parties has not engaged 
more citizens nor led them to think their elections provide a 
mechanism to hold government accountable. Figure 4 illustrates 
that apart from Republicans in 2004, there is little to suggest that 
people felt government was more responsive to elections than in 
previous decades. Using the standard NES measure of "having a 
say in government," Figure 5 found 2004 approaching a record 
low of political efficacy for Americans. Data such as these in 
Figures 4 and 5 suggest that a malaise about the efficacy of elec 
tions and representative democracy has persisted since the 1980s. 
Some suggest that low tumout and cynicism about represen 
tative democracy reflect public frustration with the political 
choices American parties present (Amy 2002). Although it is 
difficult to establish the causal relationships between elite polar 
ization, apathy toward parties, and cynicism about elections and 
voter participation, participation is associated with the polariza 
tion of American elections. Safe, politically homogeneous legis 
lative seats not only produce representatives farther from a 
national median voter, but these uncompetitive districts have 
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Figure 4 
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Source: National Election Study. 
Note: Percent saying "a good deal," by party identification. 
Figure 5 
Do You Have a Say in Government? 
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Source: National Election Study. 
Note: Percent who disagree with the statement "most people have 
no say," by party identification. 
less campaign activity, which translates into less participation 
especially for the young and for people with less interest in pol 
itics than partisans (Donovan and Tolbert 2007). Uncompetitive 
states also correspond with less participation in presidential con 
tests (Bowler and Donovan n.d.). 
A Missing Middle 
A two-party system dominated by ideologically polarized par 
ties and uncompetitive elections may do little to link a large 
part of the public with representative democracy. Indeed, trends 
toward having ideologically distinct parties and less electoral 
competition correspond with greater cynicism about representa 
tive democracy. This cynicism may be exacerbated if (realisti 
cally or unrealistically) citizens devalue partisan conflict 
(Hibbing and Theiss-Morse 2002). If this is the case, then con 
temporary electoral arrangements may alienate a substantial pro 
portion of the electorate. 
Admittedly, the discussion here misrepresents what the 1950s 
reformers sought. Although there is evidence of greater polariza 
tion among party elites and party identifiers, this need not mean 
we ever achieved a responsible two-party system. The system 
described in the 1950 report was modeled on the assumption of 
legislative supremacy or at least legislative parity with the exec 
utive. This is a form of government that has been on the wane. 
Furthermore, one forgotten aspect of the report is that it stressed 
the need to "give all sections of the country a real voice" in 
elections,7 rather than continue with the "blight of one-party 
monopoly" that results in the concentration of campaign re 
sources in a few pivotal areas. 
Even with the one-party South transformed, there are fewer 
two-party competitive U.S. House contests now than in 1950. 
The decline in competitive districts and the rise of incumbent 
advantages were noted decades ago (e.g., Mayhew 1974; Fere 
john 1977), but conditions have become even less competitive 
since then. Presidential and House elections are now structured 
such that many people live in places where they have no influ 
ence on elections. These voters are not exposed to national elec 
tion campaigns unless they live in a handful of competitive 
presidential states such as Ohio, or in a rare, competitive U.S. 
House district. The U.S. has polarized parties without competi 
tive elections; distinctive parties that offer many voters irrele 
vant elections between candidates who may be too extreme for 
them, with only one candidate having a chance to win. 
Electoral Polarization, Competition, and 
Reform 
Partisan polarization, then, by morphing with uncompetitive 
elections, has gone from being part of the preferred solution to 
what ails the American system, to possibly being a key force 
driving discontent with representative democracy. By extension it 
may also be driving interest in election reform. If either the fail 
ure to represent the large center of the American electorate or the 
dearth of meaningful elections (or both) is the source of discon 
tent with representative democracy, then we must consider how 
various contemporary reformist impulses affect party polarization 
and electoral competition. At one level, it seems there is some 
consensus among reform proponents that "something" should be 
done to restore "faith" in American elections. For example, we 
might find substantial agreement that rules should insure that 
only eligible voters vote, and that their votes are counted as accu 
rately as possible. There may be much less consensus about other 
reform goals, and even less about how these goals should be ac 
complished. Nonetheless, let us, for the sake of argument, as 
sume we have consensus about some basic goals and that we 
have knowledge of how to achieve such goals. Assume that every 
vote cast would be a perfect reflection of what only eligible, par 
ticipating voters intended. Assume that ethics reforms prevent 
legislators from accepting free luxury travel and skybox tickets 
from lobbyists. Assume, further, that voter registration record 
keeping was flawless and presented eligible voters no barriers to 
participating. Assume that poll workers were perfectly trained, 
every polling place had optimal resources, and early voting was 
available for every eligible voter. Would, as a result of all of this, 
the mass public come to participate more, or to see elections as 
more meaningful? Would it lead more people to perceive that 
there were elected officials who shared their preferences? Would 
such reforms increases the public's sense that elections make 
government pay attention, or their belief that voting and elections 
give them a say in what government does? 
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Perhaps-but only as much as attitudes about the efficacy of 
elections are driven by perceptions of accuracy in registration, 
fairness in vote counts, problems with butterfly ballots, hanging 
chads, and the latest revelations about improper behavior by leg 
islators and lobbyists. Downward trends in opinions about elec 
toral efficacy displayed here, however, pre-date the 2000 Florida 
election fiasco that motivated the Help America Vote Act 
(HAVA) and also pre-date the Jack Abramoff / Duke Cunning 
ham / Mark Foley / Tom Delay et al. indictments and scandals 
that motivated the 2006-2007 round of ethics reforms. The most 
accurate registration records and vote counting systems, further 
more, would likely do little to affect electoral competition nor 
affect how the major parties and the electoral system represent 
(or fail to represent) the preferences of marginally interested 
Americans who think of themselves as centrists or moderates. 
HAVA-like reforms are motivated by events that occur in 
competitive contests (e.g., Florida and Ohio) where high num 
bers of voters are mobilized by competitive campaigns, where 
polling places are swamped with voters, and where subtle local 
administrative acts can have the capacity to affect election re 
sults. HAVA has generated substantial funds for research into 
the minutia of the machinery of elections. HAVA-like adminis 
trative reforms may make it more difficult to steal elections, but 
they fail to address the fact that most elections in most places 
remain so uncompetitive that they are not worth stealing. 
Make Elections Worth Stealing 
I suggest above that competition resulting from marginal dis 
tricts may also affect political polarization. Electoral 
competition-the mobilization of candidates and campaign re 
sources in an environment where election outcomes are rela 
tively uncertain-is also a force that can mobilize people to 
participate in politics. Empirical research suggests that people 
respond to meaningful electoral choices and electoral competi 
tion. Competition in U.S. House races increases turnout (Cox 
and Munger 1989). Multiparty systems have higher voter turn 
out (Blais and Carty 1990) and higher levels of citizen satisfac 
tion with how democracy works (Anderson and Guillory 1997). 
Referendums and initiatives bring people to the polls and 
choices associated with these may stimulate political efficacy 
(Smith and Tolbert 2004). Local "semi-PR systems" used 
(rarely) in the U.S. can expand the range of candidates compet 
ing for office, and thus increase campaign activity and voter 
turnout (Bowler et al. 2004). 
Efforts to improve poll-worker training, and improve the ac 
curacy of vote tabulation and voter registration rolls are neces 
sary and laudable, but errors associated with voting machines, 
and the effects of duplicity in election administration are most 
likely to have consequences where election outcomes are rela 
tively uncertain. Thus, an electoral context where more contests 
are marginal may increase incentives for fraud. This should be a 
primary goal for reforms. Electoral competition is greater in 
marginal seats. It is the mechanism that makes elections more 
responsive to the distribution of mass preferences, the mecha 
nism that provides accountability, and the mechanism by which 
citizens are mobilized and engaged by representative democracy. 
There are reforms that target forces beyond voter interactions 
with poll-workers and voting machinery. How might these affect 
electoral competition? Reducing barriers to candidate entry might 
provide voters with more choices. Burden's (2007) article in this 
symposium finds that ballot access rules have clear effects on 
whether minor-party candidates appear on ballots, but he also 
finds their candidacies have little effect on election outcomes. 
Indeed, their vote share is inversely related to the competitive 
ness of races they enter. In a Single Member Simple Plurality 
(SMSP) system where such candidates have little chance of rep 
resentation, they remain a protest vehicle. Barriers to entry may 
also be reduced via public financing of campaigns. Werner and 
Mayer's (2007) article in this symposium shows that the public 
campaign finance options in Maine and Arizona are particularly 
attractive to candidates in the least competitive races, which may 
mute the programs' effects on electoral competitiveness. Reduc 
ing barriers to voter participation is also promoted as a means to 
get more citizens engaged with elections. However Gronke 
et al.'s (2007, this symposium) study of early voting demon 
strates that the effects of making voting more convenient are 
modest. Without increasing mobilization efforts and interest in 
elections, convenience voting will have limited effects on turnout 
and the composition of the electorate. By failing to address the 
structure of electoral competition, even these reforms may have 
little effect on public engagement with representative democracy. 
Changes in districting practices, then, may offer the greatest 
prospect for increasing electoral competition. Districting prac 
tices in Arizona and Iowa have been held as models for better 
practices. McDonald (2007) shows in his contribution to this 
symposium that few states use such outcome-based districting 
practices that emphasize competition, and that enforcement of 
competition criteria relies on state, rather than federal courts. If 
uncompetitive elections are mainly the product of a "natural" 
pattern of like partisans locating in similar places (rather than 
gerrymanders), even the most non-partisan, independent SMSP 
districting plans may be unable to affect electoral competition. 
Yet among the many reforms to attract attention from political 
science this decade, those targeting districting practices and dis 
trict magnitude are the most explicit in aiming to alter the struc 
ture of elections to increase electoral competition. 
The argument about electoral reforms here may be under 
stood in terms of a baseball analogy. Administrative reforms are 
analogous to perfecting how balls, strikes, and base-running are 
called in a baseball game. Accurate calls are critical, but they 
are not likely to fill the stands with fans. People watch a game 
to see their team win, or because of interest in an important 
game. Perfect scoring is meaningless if only one team takes the 
field, and attendance will suffer if two teams are playing that no 
one can cheer for. 
Notes 
1. There has also been a steady increase in the net likes and dislikes that 
partisans cite about their rival party's presidential candidates since 1956. 
2. Homogeneous one-party districts may elect ideologically extreme 
members. Ansolabehere et al. (2001) find competitive races are more likely 
to produce moderate candidates. Also see Fiorina (1973); Sullivan and Us 
laner (1978). 
3. Marginal, centrist Democrats (according to DW-NOMINATE scores) 
included: Salazar (CO 03); Higgins (NY 27); Bean (IL 08); Costa (CA 20); 
Barrow (GA 12). 
4. E.g., Sordel (IN 09) .518; Hostettler (IN 02) .712; Choc?la (IN 02) 
.644; Taylor (NC 11) .537. 
5. The Supreme Court has reduced advance registration to 30 days 
maximum. Motor Voter registration, early voting, and the expansion of 
no-excuse absentee voting have occurred while turnout remained stagnant. 
6. Turnout by voting-age population (VAP) oscillated below a high 
point of 55% from 1972 to 2004, after being higher in the 1960s. Michael 
McDonald demonstrates that as a percent of voting-eligible population 
(VEP), turnout in 2004 actually approached the higher levels of the 
1960s. 
7. This was in reference to presidential elections under the Electoral 
College. 
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